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Many theists find resources to defend their beliefs in the important 
literary and apologetic work of C.S. Lewis. There is much to be said for 
Lewis’s popular style, rhetoric, and incisiveness. It is persuasive and 
pleasurable reading, and perfectly effective when we are in what we 
might call the popular room. But philosophers and laymen 
sometimes—perhaps often, these days—find the standards on cogent 
argumentation raised, and indeed want them raised. 
Consider, for instance, the powerful critical assessment, by academic 
philosophers, of the currently popular arguments against theistic belief. 
Popular atheological arguments wither under such scrutiny.[1] Of course, 
serious atheists may be unimpressed. The standards for atheological 
argumentation also go much higher than anything imagined 
in Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennett, and a host of other popular writers. 
The work of atheistic thinkers such as John Mackie, Jordan Howard 
Sobel and William Rowe, for example, is much more powerful, if much 
less popular. So, how well does theistic belief do when the standards and 
expectations on good reasoning are at their highest? How well does 
religious belief do when, as David Lewis described it, we are in 
the philosophy room? 
In the philosophy room, the otherwise impressive work of C.S. Lewis is 
much less helpful. His work will not serve to defend theistic belief in the 
face of the sheer critical power and breadth of, say, John Mackie’s The 
Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) or Jordan 
Sobel’s Logic and Theism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
For illustration, it will be useful to consider the interplay between John 
Mackie’s most forceful—and often underestimated—challenge to 
theistic belief, and Alvin Plantinga’s ingenious—and often 
misunderstood—response to that challenge. The debate concerns a 
single issue, but the standards of reasoning invoked in addressing the 
issue are worthy of emulation. 
In the well-known essay, ‘Evil and Omnipotence‘, John Mackie 
reformulated a familiar challenge to theistic belief that has come to be 
known as the logical problem of evil.[2] It’s not uncommon in 
philosophy that a familiar argument receives a powerful and compelling 
reformulation.[3] Mackie argued that (1) – (3) form an inconsistent triad: 
  
(1) God is omnipotent, (2) God is wholly good and (3) Evil exists 
Any two of the propositions entails the falsity of the third. How does the 
inconsistency arise?According to Mackie, the inconsistency is explicit 
once we add the quasi-logical rules that (4) necessarily, a good thing 
always eliminates evil as far as it can and (5) necessarily, there are no 
limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. 
There have been counterexamples offered to the propositions in (4) and 
(5)—these are purported exceptions that show the principles are not 
perfectly general. Perhaps a good thing might not prevent a person from 
drowning when he can do so. Perhaps he might fail to do so in order to 
save another person. And perhaps an omnipotent being is limited by the 
metaphysically possible or the logically possible—he cannot make 2 + 2 
= 5 and he cannot make Plantinga identical to Mackie.[4] 
Of course, Mackie really intends (4) and (5) to be applied to an absolutely 
perfect being. But even granting the suggested restrictions on perfect 
goodness and omnipotence, it follows from (5) that an absolutely perfect 
being can do anything that is metaphysically (or, broadly logically) 
possible. But since it is surely metaphysically possible to eliminate all evil, 
it seems to follow from (4) and (5) that an absolutely perfect being would 
bring about a world that includes no evil at all. 
But Mackie concludes that, since it is evident that there is evil in the 
world, it must be false that (1) God is omnipotent or that (2) God is 
wholly good. Mackie does not suggest that there is no solution to this 
problem. He does suggest that an adequate solution to the logical 
problem of evil requires abandoning the traditional view of God as both 
omnipotent and wholly good. 
John Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil presents a 
spectacular challenge to the philosophically serious theist. How do we 
address the challenge? On the one hand, we don’t want to abandon the 
traditional view of God as omnipotent and wholly good. What would it 
mean to abandon such a view anyway? Wouldn’t that just be abandoning 
the position that God exists in favor of the position that some pretty 
good and pretty powerful being exists? On the other hand, there appears 
to be no seam in Mackie’s argument to slip through: it’s as seamless an 
argument as any in the literature. So there’s no obvious way to avoid his 
conclusion without giving up (1) or (2). 
“There appears to be no seam in Mackie’s argument to slip through: it’s as seamless an 
argument as any in the literature” 
Alvin Plantinga’s response to John Mackie’s logical problem of evil does 
not obviously involve abandoning either (1) or (2).[5] Plantinga instead 
gives us some interesting reasons to abandon (even the restricted 
versions of) (4) and (5). 
Plantinga aims to show that, contrary to (5), possibly, an omnipotent 
being cannot do everything that is metaphysically possible. Strictly, he 
aims to show that, possibly, an omnipotent being cannot do everything 
that is both metaphysically possible and consistent with being wholly 
good, all knowing, and necessarily existing. 
So, Plantinga is not merely aiming to show that God cannot do things 
like fail to keep a promise or fail to recall some event or cease to exist. 
Rather God cannot do some things that are metaphysically possible and 
perfectly consistent with his nature. 
Does abandoning (5) entail abandoning (1)? Mackie would surely insist 
that it does.[6] He’d no doubt urge that abandoning (5) is just a way of 
saying that God is not really omnipotent. And are there any good 
reasons to abandon (5)? 
Again, Mackie would surely insist that there are not; the reasons 
Plantinga advances assume that God cannot bring about certain 
metaphysically possible states of affairs, e.g., the free actions of rational 
agents. But that is just to assume—not to argue—that (5) is false. But 
more on this in what follows. 
In addition, Plantinga aims to show that, contrary to (4), possibly, a 
wholly good being does not always eliminate evil as far as it can. There 
are evils that serve no larger purpose—evils that can be eliminated 
without moral cost—that a wholly good being can blamelessly fail to 
eliminate. So, even the restricted version of (4) is false, if Plantinga is 
right. 
For all the ingenuity in Plantinga’s argument, the idea behind his 
response to Mackie—the famous Free Will Defense—is rather 
straightforward. The central assumption is that, possibly, there 
are significantly free agents or creatures. A significantly free agent is one 
that is free to perform a morally impermissible action A or, instead, to 
perform a morally permissible action ~A.[7] 
But, according to Plantinga, in order for the action involved to be 
genuinely free and morally valuable, it must be undetermined or 
uncaused by anything outside the agent—it must be uncaused by nature, 
for instance, and uncaused by God. If you perform some action because 
God caused you to do it, or nature caused you to do it, you did not 
perform the action freely. 
Now Plantinga asks you to imagine whether, before creation, God could 
have found himself in the following situation. God is wondering what 
sorts of things to create, and he decides to create all of the wonders and 
beauties in the vast universe. And he then wonders whether he should 
create any beings like you and me. He wonders whether he should create 
beings that are both rational and free. 
“If you perform some action because God caused you to do it, or nature caused you to 
do it, you did not perform the action freely” 
The decision might be a difficult one; he already has a great universe. 
And God might know that if he were to create me, and place me in this 
universe, that I would freely do something wrong. He might know that I 
would do something (perhaps many things) morally evil. 
If God creates me with genuine freedom, then, of course, he could not 
cause me to go morally right. But God might also know that rational and 
free agents are good things to create, even if they sometimes go wrong. 
And God might know that, if he creates me, it will involve some moral 
good and some moral evil, but the good will outweigh the evil. Perhaps 
he might know all of that. 
But even those considerations will not be enough for God to decide to 
create me. God might wonder whether he could create some other rational 
and free being that would never go wrong. God might then have his cake 
and eat it too. He’d have all the value of the created rational and free 
beings, and none of the disvalue. In that case, God would surely not 
create me. 
Now Plantinga asks you to imagine whether, before creation, God could 
have found himself in a much worse situation. God might know that, no 
matter which rational and free being he creates, and no matter what 
circumstances he creates that being in, that being will freely do something 
wrong. And Plantinga asks whether, in those circumstances, God could 
create some rational and free beings. The answer does seem to be yes, 
despite the fact that creating some free and rational agents—such as 
ourselves—will ensure that there is some moral evil. 
But it will do us good to pause for a moment and ask whether we’ve 
been blinded by all the details. Let’s back up and ask: why doesn’t God 
just actualize a morally perfect world? Why doesn’t he just bring about a 
world that includes free moral agents who always do the right thing? 
God’s omnipotent, isn’t he, why couldn’t he just do that? This is in fact a 
question that Mackie continued to press in his debate with Plantinga. 
“If God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes 
prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have 
made men such that they always freely choose the good? If there is no 
logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on one or several 
occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing 
the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice 
between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting 
freely, would sometimes go wrong; there was open to him the obviously 
better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go 
right. Clearly his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent 
with his being omnipotent and wholly good”.[8] 
Plantinga agrees that it is not (broadly) logically impossible that God 
should create rational and free agents that always go right, and he agrees 
that God is omnipotent, but insists that God might be unable to do what it 
is logically possible for him to do. 
There are morally perfect worlds—that is, worlds where every free agent 
always goes morally right—and it is (broadly) logically possible that God 
actualizes a morally perfect world. But God might still be unable to 
actualize a morally perfect world. 
Let’s revisit how this is possible. Plantinga asks us to imagine the 
possibility that every rational and free being that God could create would 
freely do something wrong, no matter what circumstances they were 
created in. In the world we are imagining, all of these beings suffer from 
what Plantinga describes as transworld depravity. 
God knows, for instance, that if he creates Almeida and places him in 
difficult and trying circumstances, he’d freely do something wrong. And 
he knows that, if he creates Almeida, and places him in nice and 
comfortable circumstances, he’d still freely do something wrong. No 
matter where he creates this guy, he is going to freely do something 
morally wrong. And, unfortunately, in the world we are imagining, the 
same goes for anyone else he might create. 
What God cannot do is create Almeida, or anyone else, and cause him to 
go freely right. He cannot do that since, if God causes someone to go 
right, then they do not freely go right. 
So here is God’s dilemma: If I create rational and free beings, the world 
might thereby be improved, but I’m guaranteed that they do something 
wrong. There is nothing I can do about that; I cannot cause these free 
beings to go right. My options seem to be (1) Choose not to create any 
of them or (2) Choose to create the ones that, at least, won’t go horribly 
wrong. It is not among my options, contrary to Mackie, to choose to 
bring about a morally perfect world. The rational and free agents I create 
could bring about such a world—they could all choose always to go 
morally right—but I’m not able to do it. 
“What God cannot do is create Almeida, or anyone else, and cause him to go freely right. 
He cannot do that since, if God causes someone to go right, then they do not freely go 
right” 
Given God’s dilemma, what should he do? Plantinga argues that God is 
permitted to create rational and free beings that he knows will sometimes 
go wrong if it is true that some world with such beings—even granting 
the moral evil that they will bring about—is better than any world with 
no rational and free beings.[9] 
If God might face a choice in which some world with such fallible beings 
is better than any world without them, then, Plantinga concludes, it is 
possible that God coexists with evil. That, in brief, is Alvin Plantinga’s 
Free Will Defense. 
Is the Free Will Defense successful? There are at least two conditions 
that must be met for it to succeed. First, the Free Will Defense must be 
consistent with God’s omnipotence. Recall that God is omnipotent only 
if, necessarily, God can do anything that is (broadly) logically 
possible.[10] It might not be unreasonable to consider, instead, the 
weaker notion that God is omnipotent only if, necessarily, God can do 
anything that is (broadly) logically possible and consistent with his nature 
as essentially omniscient, perfectly good, and necessarily existing. 
But, second, the Free Will Defense succeeds only if it is consistent with 
God’s perfect goodness. There are many reasonable conditions on God’s 
perfect goodness. Here’s one, rather weak, condition: God is perfectly 
good only if, necessarily, God actualizes a morally perfect world. 
Now Mackie might complain that the Free Will Defense violates both of 
these conditions. According to the Free Will Defense, it is possible that 
God is unable to bring about a (broadly) logically possible state of affairs 
that is consistent with his divine nature. It is possible, according to 
Plantinga, that God is unable to actualize a morally perfect world. But 
there are morally perfect worlds! And actualizing such a world would not 
entail that God lacks any of the traditional attributes! 
If God is omnipotent, Mackie might urge, then, necessarily, he can 
actualize such a world. Mackie can agree that God’s omnipotence is 
compatible with, possibly, God’s being unable to cause significantly free 
agents to always go right. There are, we agree, no possible worlds where 
that happens. But it is not compatible with God being unable to actualize 
a morally perfect world. After all, there is a world where that happens! 
Or, so Mackie might insist. 
Mackie might also complain that an essentially morally perfect being 
necessarily actualizes a morally perfect world. If that is true, then there 
simply are no possible worlds that are not morally perfect. The existence 
of such worlds is not compatible with the existence of God! But the Free 
Will Defense simply assumes that there are morally imperfect worlds and 
aims to show that, possibly, God is unable to actualize a morally perfect 
world. 
Of course, Mackie’s complaints can be resisted in a variety of ways. I will 
not pursue those lines of response here. My aim has been to show that 
the level of discussion among serious theists and serious atheists is 
extraordinarily high. Clearly, arguments for and against theism (and for 
and against atheism) can be carried on at a level of discourse that leaves 
popular discussion of these views far behind, beside the point, and 
largely irrelevant. 
Atheists would do well to emulate the work of, among others, John 
Mackie, J. Howard Sobel, William Rowe, and Michael Tooley [See Oppy 
on the work of academic atheists]. Theists would be equally well 
served to emulate the work of, among others, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van 
Inwagen, Brian Leftow, and Richard Swinburne. These are among the 
best representatives of their respective positions. Of course, these 
thinkers are also much less accessible and much more demanding and, 
alas, much less popular. 
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